The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has played an important role in restructuring the Korean economy over the past three years. Relying upon survey data collected in 1998 and 1999, this paper explores the role of the IMF in Korea, as perceived by its citizens. In the eyes of the Korean people, the IMF helped their economy to recover from the crisis. However, those Koreans who experience a decline in their income, are critical of the IMF intervention in their economy. Finally, our analysis of the public attitude data reveals that the pro-IMF orientations among the Korean people have little to do with their support for a market-oriented reform program.
I. Introduction
The outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has served to highlight the fact that the IMF can play a far more critical role in dealing with an economic exigency than any other international organization. Evaluations of its role in managing economic crises to date have been done on three separate levels: by professional economists, the news media, and ordinary citizens. Jeffrey Sachs, and many other economists, have generated a large and ever increasing body of literature on the IMF intervention in the Asian economic crisis (see Blecker 1999 Systematic research on public perceptions of the IMF intervention, however, is essential to its effort to rescue any national economic system in a state of crisis. As recent research on economic reforms has indicated (Stokes 2001 , Williamson 1994 , such perceptions constitute a powerful force, which can determine the success of a given economic restructuring program.
Without the proper understanding and support of the people, who experience its painful consequences on a daily basis, any one or more of the many parts of the program cannot be implemented effectively for any extended period. From the perspective of policymakers managing the crisis, therefore, it is important to discern how the IMF is perceived as an agency in a position to demand economic reform.
There is an ongoing public debate about the proper role the IMF should play in managing economic crises. Critics argue that the IMF is not really suited to the task of fostering structural economic reforms, and that it is constantly over-stepping its mandate (see, for instance, Jeffrey Sachs Financial Times December 11 1997, Katz 1998, and Naim 1995) . Supporters of IMF policies, on the other hand, point out that it has been a positive influence in the recovery of many economies in need of fundamental restructuring (see, for instance, Michael Camdessus
The Washington Post November 10 1998, Fischer 1998 , Krueger 1997 , and Summers 1998 .
What is entirely missing from this debate, are the perceptions of the IMF held by ordinary people directly involved in the process of economic restructuring. This paper represents a first endeavor to analyze public perceptions of the IMF role in restructuring an economy during and after a crisis. For this analysis, South Korea (hereinafter Korea) was selected for two reasons. Korea is a country that the IMF had to bail out with the largest loan package ever, requiring the fundamental restructuring of all major sectors of its economy. It is also a country that rapidly and successfully recovered from the Asian financial crisis. The survey data assembled for the present analysis came from the Korea Barometer surveys that were conducted in 1998 and 1999, the two successive years following the IMF bailout in December 1997. These two surveys asked several questions concerning the role of the IMF in managing the Korean economic crisis. This paper is organized into six sections. In the section immediately following, we examine briefly the evolution of the economic crisis in Korea, and we highlight the role of the IMF in reforming its economy. With univariate analysis of the Korean survey data, Section Three examines whether the Korean people perceived the specified conditions of the IMF bailout as having been contributing factors in the worsening of their economic problems. It also examines whether they perceived the program to have helped bring about the subsequent recovery of their country's economy. With an ordered logit regression model, Section Four examines which segments of the Korean population are relatively favorably oriented towards the IMF. Section
Five looks critically at the policy issues that are closely linked with the positive assessment of the IMF role in the economic recovery. Finally, we summarize our results and conclude.
II. A Brief Account of the Role of the IMF in Restructuring the Korean Economy
The Korean economic crisis, which lowered its GNP per capita by one-third, from $10,000 to $6,600 in a single year, was to a large extent a home-grown crisis (Chang 1999 , Chang et al. 1998 , Haggard et al. 1999 , S.H. Kim 2000 , S. Kim 2000 , Lee 1998 , Mo and Moon 1999a , 1999b , Moon 1999 , I. Shin 2000 . It resulted from ill-conceived liberalization, weak financial regulation, and poor systems of corporate governance (Mo and Moon 1999a) . Under the IMF bailout program, much needed financial reforms were instituted along with changes in the operations of the chaebols, the most powerful economic institutions in Korea which became overburden with high debt ratios and extremely vulnerable to the rapidly changing conditions of the international financial markets. The policies chosen to restructure the ailing economy were a mix between the economic policy preferences of the Korean government, and conditions imposed by the IMF. In general, it is difficult to measure the influence of IMF reforms on the economic performance of a country (see Haque and Kahn 1998 for a recent assessment). In the case of Korea, however, it may be even more difficult because the IMF changed its conditions for economic reform significantly during the course of the first program year (IMF 1999 , Lee 1998 ).
The IMF agreed to provide Korea with financial assistance on November 21, 1997. In this regard, it accepted the first "letter of intent" from the Korean government that contained the typical IMF conditions in terms of financial sector restructuring, fiscal tightening, capital account and trade liberalization, and labor market reforms. It should be noted, however, that a dramatic course of events greatly influenced the contents of that program, as evidenced by the quickly shifting recommendations to deal with the fiscal deficit. The first "letter of intent" recommended a government surplus of 2 percent. The third "letter of intent," issued on February 7, 1998, proposed a fiscal deficit of 1 percent. In the fourth "letter," on May 2nd, the targeted deficit was raised to 2 percent, and in the fifth "letter," on July 24th, it was raised to 5 percent. It is debatable now whether these rate changes show the flexibility of the IMF in adjusting to rapidly shifting economic situations, or whether it reflects its inability to estimate accurately the severity of the Korean crisis (Katz 1999) .
Most economists would agree that the provision of liquidity by the IMF was beneficial, as the Korean government had almost no foreign reserves left, while other parts of the reform package find less support. In hindsight it is easy to argue that the IMF conditions regarding fiscal policy were not appropriate at the beginning of the crisis. It is less clear, however, whether this caused any significant damage to the Korean economy. In any case, given the importance of liquidity at that time, a fair assessment would probably be that the overall impact of the IMF intervention in the Korean economic crisis was positive.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the Korean crisis can be regarded as a temporary break in its overall performance (Lee and Rhee 2000) . While growth rates were negative in all quarters of 1998, they became positive in 1999 and thereafter. The same is true of the inflation rate, which rose to over 15 percent in the first quarter of 1998, and then steadily declined. The only indicator that has not improved much over the past three years is the unemployment rate, which stayed above its pre-crisis level. Lee and Rhee (2000) attributed the quicker recovery in Korea, as compared with the other Asian countries, to the high degree of openness and private sector orientation of the Korean economy, conditions upon which the IMF insisted.
III. Public Attitudes Toward the IMF
If it is difficult for economists to assess the role of the IMF in managing the Korean economic crisis, how can Koreans perceive and evaluate what it has done for their country's economy? This is an important policy issue that has not received adequate attention in the study of the Asian economic crisis. The 1998 and 1999 Korea Barometer surveys asked a number of relevant questions that provide a basis for analyzing this issue. Each of these two surveys interviewed about 1,000 voters (20 years old and older) face-to-face, representing the adult population in Korea. The sampling and fieldwork procedures employed in these two surveys are described in detail in Shin and Rose (1998, 2000) . Do the Korean people perceive the IMF bailout conditions as one factor that contributed most or least to the worsening of the economic problem facing their country? To explore this question, respondents to the 1998 Korea Barometer survey were first asked to choose the most and second most important factors in all of this, from a list containing the IMF, along with five other factors. From the same list, they were asked to name the least and second least important factor as well. Table 1 reports the percentages of their responses falling in each of these four different response categories, ranging from the most important one to the least important.
Of the six factors, Koreans perceived the economic troubles of their neighboring countries as the most important cause of their economic problems; nearly one-third (30%), the greatest proportion, blamed their neighboring countries. This other-nation factor was followed, respectively, by American pressure to open their market (28%), and the cozy relationship between government and the chaebols (21%). In stark contrast to these factors, the IMF was not mentioned at all as the most important cause of the economic downturn, although a substantial number (22%) of people viewed it as the second most important cause.
In the third column (Sum A) of Table 1 , we added the percentages referring to the most and second most important factors for a summary figure. According to the figures in this column, Koreans blamed the cozy relationships between government and the chaebols more than anything else. While more than three-quarters (78%) cited this aspect of crony capitalism as one of two important factors, one-third or less saw other factors in the same light. In the case of the IMF, a little over one-fifth (22%) saw it as an important cause of their economic problems. It ranks fourth, right after the American pressure to open their market, and the trouble of the neighboring countries.
What factors contributed least to Korea's economic problems? In response to this question, the Korean people cited democratic regime change most frequently, and government-business relationships, least frequently. This finding is quite reassuring for the stability of Korean democracy. In the case of the IMF, one-quarter (26%) mentioned it as one of the two least contributing influences to the economic problems. As it does on the scale measuring the two most important factors of those problems, the IMF ranks fourth on the scale measuring the two least important factors. In the last column of Table 1, we estimated the overall level of net support for each policy measure by subtracting the sum of "contribute least" ratings (Column 6), from that of "contribute most" ratings (Column 3). From this finding it is apparent that the Korean people rank the IMF neither as the most important nor the least important influence on their economic problems.
The 1998 Korea Barometer Survey asked its respondents to choose the two reform measures they think would help to overcome the crisis most effectively from a list containing six measures, and to also choose the two measures they think would be the least effective. For each of these measures, Table 2 In an attempt to evaluate the overall effect of the IMF intervention more directly, the 1998 and 1999 Korea Barometer surveys asked respondents a straightforward question: "Do you think the IMF bailout has helped or hurt our economic recovery?" Table 3 provides, for each survey year, the distribution of their responses across five response categories ranging from the most positive to the most negative. In 1998, the first year after the outbreak of the economic crisis, less than a majority (45%) rated the IMF role in a positive light. In striking contrast, only a small minority (11%) rated its role either very negatively or somewhat negatively. Even during the period when the economic crisis was deepening, the Korean people as a whole were feeling more positively than negatively about the IMF.
In 1999, the Korean economy's downturn stopped, and it began to grow again, registering an impressive rate of a 10 percent GNP growth, and a 9 percent growth in 2000. As their national economy began to improve, the Korean people began to feel more positive about the role of the IMF in the recovery process. A large majority rated the IMF role positively (71%). A very small minority rated it negatively (7%). Evidently, the improving condition of the national economy motivated many Koreans to shift their views on the IMF to ones more favorable. In summary, Koreans do not seem to hold the view that the IMF intervention was counter-productive, as Taylor (1998) , for instance, has argued.
IV. Explaining the Assessment of the IMF Intervention
Which segments of the Korean population evaluated the IMF intervention favorably and unfavorably? Why do some Koreans believe that the IMF intervention has helped the economic recovery, while others do not? These questions will now be addressed with the results of a regression analysis. The dependent variable is the question that taps the impact of the IMF bailout on the economic recovery (see Table 3 ). The explanatory variables in the ordered logit model comprise the various characteristics of individual respondents. These include: sociodemographics, economic standing, degree of information, political party identification, and willingness to bear the financial burden of economic reforms.
These blocks of variables have been chosen due to data availability and theoretical interest.
First, socio-demographic variables reflect other influences on the dependent variable, and they can affect the dependent variable directly. For instance, the level of educational attainment can influence attitudes on the IMF, as many of its conditions and their economic consequences can be understood only with higher levels of knowledge and information.
Second, the economic resources and position individual respondents command can shape such attitudes, because IMF polices have distributional consequences. In particular, the poor may have to suffer most, at least over the short-run. Moreover, there might be relative income effects. In addition to absolute and relative levels of income, changes in the income level over time can also affect respondents' judgments about the impact of the IMF intervention. In addition to these income variables, the status of employment is considered because the unemployment rate rose from 2 to 7 percent, in the wake of the economic crisis, and did not return to the pre-crisis level.
Third, as exposure to the relevant information and party identification are known in prior research to affect attitudes towards economic reforms (Hayo 1999) , these variables are included in our analysis as explanatory variables. The willingness to bear the burden of economic restructuring, the core of the IMF program, is also included as a regressor because it can orient people toward the program itself. Most of these explanatory variables were included only in the the 1998 Korea Barometer survey data. Results of this analysis are reported in Table 4 . In addition to normal standard errors, we also report robust standard errors (White 1980) to ensure that our results are insensitive to deviations from the homoscedasticity assumption. All significant coefficients remain significant when applying robust standard errors.
As estimated coefficients and corresponding standard errors in the table indicate, only a few explanatory variables in the regression equation are significantly associated with the dependent variable evaluating the perceived impact of the IMF on the economic recovery. In the first set of demographic variables, none is found statistically significant. In the second set of economic variables, it is not the level -absolute or relative -of income that significantly affects the evaluation of the overall impact of the IMF intervention on the economic recovery. What really matters is its growth, which was computed based on the reported income in 1997 and 1998.
Regardless of the amount of income they were earning, Koreans, who were able to increase their income during the crisis period, felt significantly more positive about the IMF role than those who were not.
By contrast, the Koreans who have a mortgage to pay for a house or apartment felt significantly more critical about the IMF than those who did not. The IMF austerity program brought about interest rate hikes, which, in turn, increased the burden of a mortgage payment (the corporate bond yield of 3 years maturity rose from 13.4% in 1997 to 15.4% in 1998). While the interest rate rise was not large in absolute terms, it took place within an environment where the collateral value of housing had decreased dramatically, making the borrowing situation for many Korean house owners extremely difficult.
Cognitively, three separate indicators are employed to measure the degree of being informed about current events. Of these items, Table 4 shows that those who feel informed about the reforms are significantly more in favor of the IMF. Judging from the fact that the size of coefficients fluctuates across the three different levels of being informed the relationship between these two variables appears to be non-linear. These differences in the size of the coefficients, however, are not statistically significant at a 5 percent level. Thus, one has to distinguish only two groups: those without any subjective knowledge about the IMF being relatively more skeptical of IMF achievements, and those who reported possessing at least a minimum amount of information.
Politically, party identification matters significantly and uniquely in evaluating the IMF role.
Identifiers with the Grand National Party (hereinafter the GN Party) rated the IMF reforms more favorably than all other Koreans with or without a partisan attachment. The GN Party was the party in power, when the IMF was called upon to rescue the Korean economy from insolvency.
Believing their party was responsible for the IMF intervention, GN Party supporters appear to remain favorably oriented to the IMF role in the economic recovery. This finding can be easily understood in the context of cognitive consistency. Since they voted for that party, they are partially responsible for inviting the IMF, and they rationalize this choice by viewing the outcome positively.
Psychologically, ordinary Koreans are not all equally committed to the restructuring of their economy. To differentiate their commitment to this task, the 1998 Korea Barometer survey asked its respondents whether they thought economic reforms have to be pursued even if it means significant hardship for them. Those who were willing to bear the burden of economic restructuring evaluated the IMF involvement more positively than those who were not.
V. Understanding the Implications of IMF Conditions
The logit analysis of the survey data makes it clear that the willingness to bear the burden of The first three variables reported in Table 5 -the laying off of unnecessary workers in the private and public sector, and privatization -are easily allocated to Factor 1. Reducing the government budget, however, does not load quite as high. Since it gets a negative sign when associated with Factor 2, we can also include it into Factor 1. Breaking up the chaebols receives a high enough loading on Factor 1, but it also has a relatively high loading on Factor 2. On the whole, Factor 1 could be interpreted as "market-oriented" economic reforms. More government control over the chaebols, banks and state enterprises is associated with Factor 2. In our view, this Factor can be termed "government-oriented" economic reforms.
The most notable of these findings is that the IMF assessment loads on Factor 2, the governmentoriented reform approach. In other words, those who think the IMF has made a positive contribution to Korea's recovery tend to support governmental intervention in the economy, not the reform policies that comprise the backbone of the IMF market-based reform program. In our view, this finding has important policy implications that we explore further in the final section.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper seeks to make a unique contribution to the literature on the Asian economic crises by analyzing how ordinary people in Korea perceive and evaluate the IMF role during the process of their country's economic recovery. The analysis of the Korea Barometer survey data collected in 1998 and 1999 has revealed that ordinary Koreans do not put much blame on the IMF bailout conditions for the worsening of the economic crisis. Nor do they tend to endorse the refusal to implement those conditions as the most effective method of dealing with their economic problems. Instead, these Koreans blame their own system of crony capitalism to the greatest extent, and they endorse the fixing of the malfunctioning system as the most effective solution to their economic problem.
On the whole, the Korean people remain oriented more favorably than unfavorably toward the IMF intervention to manage the economic crisis. With improvement in the economy over the years, they have increasingly approved of the IMF's role as a manager of the crisis. In evaluating the role of the IMF, it would be interesting to distinguish between its role as an international liquidity provider and a champion of structural reforms, which is not really possible given the questions asked in the survey. Arguably, the liquidity provision has very much contributed to the quick macroeconomic recovery of the Korean economy, and is reflected in the positive public assessment of the IMF.
In spite of this, critics of the IMF argue that the bailout of countries with large scale credits will undermine local incentives to avoid such a crisis, or in other words, that it will create a moral hazard. Given the high costs associated with the crisis, it appears unlikely that the incentive to avoid such a crisis is low in general. Further, at least in the case of Korea, there is another aspect that warrants attention, namely culture restraints. One question of the 1999 survey asked respondents whether they feel personally ashamed by the economic crisis affecting their country. More than 75 percent answered that they feel ashamed, which makes it unlikely that political leaders will not do everything that is in their power to avoid a crisis, as the loss in voter confidence is likely going to be very large.
Yet a substantial minority still disapprove of what the IMF has done in their country.
Arguably, this has more to do with specific micro-and macroeconomic conditions of the bailout package than its role as liquidity provider. These Koreans are not low-income people in either absolute or relative perspective. They comprise those that have experienced a substantial decline in their income in the aftermath of the November 1997 financial crisis. Those who have a home mortgage to pay tend to be negative about the IMF intervention. People with a higher degree of subjective information about the IMF, on the other hand, are positive in their assessment.
Supporters of the ruling party, that had to call for the IMF intervention in 1997, also remain positive. Understandably, those Koreans who are willing to endure personal hardship for the cause of economic restructuring are also among those who give greater credit to the IMF.
What is especially noteworthy is the finding that Koreans' approval of the IMF intervention is not based on an acceptance of the core principles of market-based economic restructuring as advocated by the IMF. This is quite a different concern than the typical critique of the inappropriateness of the "Washington consensus" in economic reform (Taylor 1997) . In Korea, the IMF intervention is seen as most positive by those who believe in the powerful intervention of the government in the economy. This finding raises serious concerns for IMF officials and domestic policymakers for two reasons.
First, the IMF has obviously not succeeded in clarifying and publicizing its stance on economic reforms very well. This might even be an intentional strategy, as the IMF may seek to avoid any policy controversy with unclear messages. Nonetheless, such a strategy is not likely to work well as often as is expected. When the situation becomes difficult, for example, people can attribute all failures to the IMF because it has refused to specify its policy mandates clearly to the general public. Second, in the case of Korea, support for the IMF seems to come from the "wrong" group of people. Their misunderstanding will inevitably lead to a clash with true believers in the free market economy over the proper goals and means of economic reform. This might eventually aggravate the reform process itself.
Finally, it should be noted that popular support for the IMF conditions is apparently driven by the shifting condition of the national economy rather than the specific outcome of the particular reform measures that it has pushed. It is not inappropriate for the IMF to receive credit for what it has not done. What is problematic for the IMF, though, is that it may be blamed when it is not really responsible, particularly at a time when it needs popular support most.
In conclusion, the IMF has not had to contend with the average citizen in Korea. In the future, especially when their economy sours again, there is a possibility for this institution to be at odds with those people who misunderstand the true nature of its reform program. To avoid such a conflict, it is highly desirable for the IMF to promote a better understanding of its program among ordinary Koreans on its own or in collaboration with the Korean government.
Koreans should be helped in understanding the IMF intervention in view of the true nature of its policies, and not in response to a blurred image.
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